








FROM THEORIA TO THEORY:  


















This paper explores the transition of the theological and philosophical concept of 
theoria – contemplation - to the modern notion of theory. Theory derives 
linguistically from theoria and retains a connection with knowledge. However, it has 
lost and, moreover, typically excludes theoria’s focus upon the direct experiential 
knowledge of the divine. In keeping with the thrust of this Special Issue, we focus on 
how the secularization of the theological concept of theoria defines in a profound 
manner the limits and possibilities of thinking and theorizing work and organization. 
We examine the nature of theoria and the transitions that have led to its 
metamorphosis. It is suggested that dominant forms of theorizing work and 
organization are typically performative (Lyotard, 1984). This is illustrated, somewhat 
ironically, through a review of Spiritual Leadership Theory, which appears to promote 






The Secularization of Theoria 
The Call for Papers for this special issue began with the claim that all significant 
concepts relating to the modern theory of work and organization are secularized 
theological concepts. We address this claim directly in relation to the secularization of 
the ancient Greek notion of theoria. We suggest that this secularization constitutes a 
transformation of a scale and significance such that the concepts are barely 
recognisable. Etymological dictionaries trace the concept theory from theoria, both 
from the theological writings of St Jerome (347-420 CE) and from the ancient 
philosophers of the 4th century BCE. Both terms are concerned with attaining 
knowledge but the primary focus of theoria, the knowledge of the divine, has not 
merely gone, it is excluded by dominant organizational discourses. 
 
We focus on how the secularization of the theological concept of theoria defines in a 
profound manner the limits and possibilities of thinking and theorizing work and 
organization. We have in mind, in particular, a number of approaches to theorizing 
that have dominated popular organizational discourses for several decades. In contrast 
to approaches that at least share some features in common with the practice of 
theoria, the dominant perspectives are characterised by, to our reckoning, an 
impoverished conception of theory. For example, we observe a well-established 
trajectory within a range of utilitarian approaches to organization studies as 
represented in Total Quality Management, Business Process Re-engineering and 
Cultural Excellence programmes. By way of illustration we will review one such 
aspect of organization studies that has grown significantly in the last decade: Spiritual 
Leadership Theory (SLT). We contend that, perhaps ironically, even where the 
relationship between humans and the divine is deemed significant the nature of 
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dominant modes of modern theorizing excludes serious consideration of the 
knowledge that may derive from theoria. In other words, as we point out toward the 
end of the article, SLT is a form of a-theoria par excellence. It introduces what we 
take to be impoverished definitions of spirituality and proceeds to operationalize them 
in empiricist terms to produce proxy measures of spiritual leadership and corporate 
spirituality. These measurements are then employed to test formal hypotheses in an 
attempt to establish positive correlations between spiritual leadership, workplace 
spirituality and corporate financial performance. SLT is thus illustrative of the 
argument we advance concerning the historical movement of theoria to theory. It 
exemplifies the translation of apophatic understanding, or direct encounter with the 
divine, into a theologically denuded, disenchanted and strictly utilitarian form of 
theorization.  
 
Such disenchanted objectivism and instrumental purpose is entirely antithetical to an 
approach to understanding the complexity of organizational and leadership processes 
from an appreciative understanding of theoria. The pursuit of theoria would demand 
eschewal of the instrumental in favour of a more open-ended, ethically disinterested 
and other-centred disposition toward workplace relations and responsibilities.  
 
As we will explore in detail in this paper, theoria entails an engagement with the 
unknowable and comprises knowing beyond words. As such, its incorporation into the 
theorizing of work and organization, and leadership in particular, is not without 
difficulty. In this respect, relevant literatures include those that address leadership as 
distributed (Gronn, 2000; 2002) and as process (Ladkin, 2010; Stacey, 2007; Wood, 
2005). Within this context, alongside others (Grint, 2007; Jironet, 2010), we believe it 
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is timely to undertake a reconsideration of leadership and virtue drawing on ancient 
traditions of ethical practice. In this paper we make a particular contribution to this 
shared endeavour by redressing Grint’s (2007) omission in excluding theoria from his 
review of the relevance of Aristotle’s intellectual virtues in learning to lead.  
 
Our discussion begins with an exploration of the disenchantment and secularization of 
the modern era. By contrast, it is argued that theoria is, by definition, enchanting and 
gives access to intellectual knowledge through direct experience of the divine. This 
mysterious practice is explored through the metaphor of seeing and as knowing 
beyond words. An example of theorising with resonances of theoria is considered 
from the field of psychoanalysis in Black’s (2006) notion of the contemplative 
position. The discussion then proceeds, with unavoidable brevity, to outline pertinent 
aspects of the theological and philosophical transitions that have accompanied the 
movement from theoria to theory. In order to illustrate our argument concerning the 
shift from theoria to the dominance of disenchanted theory, the paper culminates with 
a critique of Spiritual Leadership Theory, which ironically appears to exclude theoria 
thereby encouraging the practice of leadership without contemplation. 
 
Disenchantment: A Loss of Depth in Experience 
The context of the movement from theoria to theory is one of disenchantment and 
secularization. Disenchantment suggests a significant sense of loss. The term is the 
standard translation, following Weber, of the German Entzauberung, which literally 
means the separation from (Ent-) magic (Zauber), that is, the deprivation of mystique 
or the breaking of a spell. Weber appears to have borrowed the term ‘the 
disenchantment of the world’ from the writings of Friedrich Schiller (Gerth and 
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Wright Mills, 1948: 51, cited in Brown, 2004: 17), and it was in the Romantic period 
that the last significant stand, at least until the last few decades, was taken in favour of 
wonder and against the desacralization of the world (Holmes, 2008; see also, 
Bamford, 1994; Berry, 1999; Bronk, 2009; Lovelock, 1979; Roszak, 1972; 
Skolomowski, 1992). 
 
Even the notion of enchantment has become disenchanted. Derived from the Latin 
incantare, its original sense was a powerful one: to chant a magical formula, an 
incantation, or cast a spell on someone could leave them, literally, spellbound. 
However, by the late 16th century, the superficial, modern sense of enchantment – for 
example, an enchanting cottage/ little child/ story – had already begun to drain the 
word of its power (OED, 1993; Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, 1988). 
 
Pertinent to our purposes, an important dimension of disenchantment is the separation 
that may take place between lived experience and our accounts of that experience. In 
a similar vein, Hadot contrasts philosophy as a way of life with philosophy as textual 
commentary (Hadot, 2002: 150; Hadot, 1995). It is a dichotomy between lived 
experience and worded communication which Karl Rahner described in relation to his 
own theology, thus: 
When I love, when I am tormented by questions, when I am sad, when I am 
faithful, when I feel longing, this human and lived existential reality is a unity 
[...] that is not fully communicated by the idea of this reality that makes it an 





In this sense we argue that disenchantment entails a loss of depth in the levels of 
connection between thought and experience. Similarly, secularization loses such 
depth through the denial of layers of experience. Although secular has come to mean 
worldly (in contrast to spiritual), the Latin saeculum meant ‘the period of one 
generation (i.e. 33⅓ years)’ (A Smaller Latin-English Dictionary, 1933). This 
devaluing or dismissal of anything but the immediate past and future has intensified 
greatly in recent decades, as evidenced in the time scales on which the world’s money 
markets operate – a movement from ‘one generation’ to ‘the instant’, from 
secularization to what might be called instantization. Rather in the way that tsunamis 
can level everything in their path, a series of cultural tectonic shifts in Western society 
has sent out shock waves that have erased certain dimensions of human experience, 
leaving a ‘wasteland of the spirit’ (Roszak, 1972: xxxiii) and reducing humans to ‘one 
dimension’ (Marcuse, 1964). The terminology inherited from the past, in this instance 
the concept ‘theory’, has been divorced from the context in which it received its 
meaning.  
 
Globalization implies the worldwide spread of what is left after these tectonic shifts – 
in particular: rationalism, positivism, reductionism, individualism, secularization, 
utilitarianism, and performativity (Lyotard, 1984). The processes of secularization and 
disenchantment are clearly evident in the linguistic currency of work and organization 
where the performative notions (in a Lyotardian sense) of targets and the bottom line 
contrast strikingly with the aspirational ideals of the classical, medieval, renaissance 
and romantic worlds: Beauty, Truth, Being, the Good, the Real, the Sublime, the 




‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty,’ – that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
(Keats, 1956: 210; Ode on a Grecian Urn)   
 
Theoria – Direct Knowledge of the Divine 
When John Cassian (c. 360-435 CE) used the Latin term contemplatio, it was to 
translate for the Western Church the notion of theoria (Ramsey, 2004), already in 
common use in the Eastern Church as a result of its engagement with Hellenistic 
philosophy. Eastern Orthodox theologians use the term theoria to this day to refer to 
the experience of illumination, the vision of God (Ware, 1986: 397), which precedes 
theosis, or deification, the direct or mystical union between God and man (Ware, 
1982: 23). In the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions, such direct contemplative 
experiences of God have at times been treated with suspicion and ‘condemned as 
quietism, illuminism, subjectivism, and so on’ (Thomas Merton in the Foreword to 
Johnston, 1974: viii. See also Keating, 1992: 22-6; Needleman, 1993). However, 
throughout the history of the church there has been clear teaching on theoria 
including, for example, St John of the Cross for whom the first stage of contemplation 
was the ‘prayer of loving attention’ and St Teresa of Avila, the ‘prayer of quiet’.  
 
Seeing 
The key to understanding the term theoria – and hence of contemplatio – is that its 
basis is in vision, seeing, observation. The root word is thea, meaning a sight or view; 
its sense extended to theatron, a place for seeing shows (theatre), and to theorein, to 




The term theoria was already in common usage when it was employed by Aristotle 
and other 4th century BCE philosophers. It previously referred to a ‘specific civic 
institution’ (Nightingale, 2004: 3): the journey or pilgrimage made on behalf of the 
community to a religious festival or oracle by a theoros (the pilgrim, the one who 
goes to see). The practice of theoria encompassed the whole journey but with a focus 
upon seeing the event or object, often through participation in a sacred ritual. The 
theoros would return and recount the story of the journey in order to transmit to the 
community what had been seen.  
 
This notion of theoria was appropriated by the philosophers to refer to the act of 
seeing divine truths. A number, including Plato, retained the metaphor of journeying 
to reflect the intellectual search for truth. Aristotle, however, dispensed with the 
metaphor of a round-trip journey:  
Rather, the act of spectating is the final goal or telos of this activity – nothing 
is produced or generated “beyond” that goal... Aristotelian theorizing is simply 
a matter of intellectual “vision” and is not nested in or connected to practical 
projects. (Nightingale, 2004: 187-8) 
 
Medieval theology retained Aristotle’s understanding of theoria as intellectual virtue 
in the sense of essentially a receptive, rather than active, attitude of mind. The 
German philosopher and theologian Pieper (1999 [1952]) describes this by analogy 
with the contemplation of a rose: ‘to “look” in this sense, means to open one’s eyes 
receptively to whatever offers itself to one’s vision, and the things seen enter into us, 
so to speak, without calling for any effort or strain on our part to possess them’ (p.26). 
In a talk on contemplation and art Pieper (1990) took great pains to emphasize the 
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primacy of seeing in contemplation: ‘So, once again: to contemplate means first of all 
to see – and not to think!’ (p.73). 
 
Knowing Beyond Words 
Theoria was able to pass directly from Greek philosophy into Christian theology 
because it is based on a shared level of experience: the direct knowledge of the divine 
unmediated by concepts. Thus, Louth begins his discussion of ‘the origins of the 
Christian mystical tradition’ with Plato:  
Mystical theology, or perhaps better, a doctrine of contemplation, is not 
simply an element in Plato’s philosophy, but something that penetrates and 
informs his whole understanding of the world. ... The soul is naturally divine 
and seeks to return to the divine realm. And it does this in the act of 
contemplation – theoria – of Being, Truth, Beauty, Goodness. This act of 
theoria is not simply consideration or understanding; it is union with, 
participation in, the true objects of true knowledge. (Louth, 1981: 1, 3) 
 
However, notions such as union with or the direct experience of and beyond words are 
problematic, when it comes to communicating such experiences through language. It 
is clearly hard to express in words any deep experience – at least in a form that 
communicates to the listener or reader the actual texture of the experience (Lang, 
1981). Hence the remark attributed to Robert Frost that ‘Poetry is what gets lost in 
translation.’ Something similar might be said of theory. It is precisely the desire to 
express for others the insights from their experience of theoria that leads poets and 
mystics of all religious traditions to push beyond the limits of the possibilities of 
language (Sells, 1994). They seek to go beyond merely talking about what they know 
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in an attempt to initiate the attentive reader into a form of knowing, which ‘is always 
experience, or rather it is an inner metamorphosis.’ (Hadot, 1993: 48) 
 
In the Christian tradition, this has led to two contrasting forms of theology: the 
apophatic and the cataphatic. The importance of apophaticism for the discussion of 
theoria cannot be overestimated and it would not be too much to suggest that 
apophatic theology stands at the very opposite pole to performativity (Lyotard, 1984), 
utilitarianism and the knowledge society.  
 
Apophasis is rooted in negation, literally ‘un-saying’ or ‘speaking-away’ (Sells, 1994: 
2): ‘apophasis is a Greek neologism for the breakdown of speech, which in the face of 
the unknowability of God, falls infinitely short of the mark’ (Turner, 1995: 20).  It is 
this essential unknowability of God, which is at the centre of apophatic theology. A 
key figure in the development of apophaticism was an unidentified 5th century writer, 
variously known as Denys the Areopagite, Dionysius or Pseudo-Dionysius:  
[T]he higher we ascend the more our words are straitened by the fact that what 
we understand is seen more and more altogether in a unifying and simplifying 
way; just as now on our entry into the darkness that is beyond understanding, 
we find not mere brevity of words, but complete wordlessness and failure of 
the understanding. (Denys, in Louth, 1981: 165) 
 
This, in essence, is the paradox at the heart of theoria: knowledge of great value arises 
when we embrace our ignorance and allow ourselves to be immersed in a thick cloud 
in which we lose all our familiar bearings and do not know either where we are or 




There is, therefore, an irony in the phrase apophatic theology: theology means 
discourse about God, whereas apophaticism recognises that no meaningful discourse 
about God is possible. In a state of theoria-contemplation, one does, in a sense, 
simply not know, even though, paradoxically, this is a place of deep knowing. 
 
The second form of theology is cataphaticism, kataphasis meaning ‘affirmation, 
saying, speaking-with’ (Sells, 1994: 31), which speaks of the attributes of God rather 
than of unknowability: ‘it is the Christian mind deploying all the resources of 
language in the effort to express something about God and in that straining to speak 
theology uses as many voices as it can’ (Turner, 1995: 20). As Louth puts it, 
cataphatic theology ‘is concerned with what we affirm about God: apophatic theology 
is concerned with our understanding of God, when, in the presence of God, speech 
and thought fail us and we are reduced to silence’ (Louth, 1981: 165). 
 
Despite the esotericism of these ideas and what might appear to be their irrelevance to 
work and organization, it is interesting to note that detailed analysis of interviews with 
leaders has revealed surprising evidence of their use of apophatic language (French 
and Simpson, 2006). Some un-said or downplayed their own leadership, 
acknowledging their ignorance before their knowledge or, at the very least, the limits 
to that knowledge. They questioned the everyday conception of, and projection onto, 
the leader as the-one-who-knows. 
 
Thus, even within the discourses of theology, the movement from apophasis to 
cataphasis could be seen as a form of disenchantment. At times in the history of the 
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Church the tension between these two perspectives has turned into open warfare. In 
particular, this has occurred the apophatic impulse has been actively discouraged as, 
for example, in the Hesychast controversy in 14th century Byzantium (MacCulloch, 
2009: 482-491) or the condemnation of Quietism in 17th century France (Thompson-
Uberuaga, 2005). 
 
Fundamentally, the issues outlined here relate to depth; that is, to the question of 
which levels of experience are accepted as valid and which are excluded. As Hadot 
writes in relation to the wisdom of Plotinus, ‘It is mystical wisdom, which has no 
meaning for whomever has not experienced divine union’ (Hadot, 1993: 72). In 
relation to the exclusion of theoria from thinking and theorizing work and 
organization we are, therefore, alluding to a transformation in the legitimacy of 
certain forms of experience. This entails the removal of levels of meaning through the 
denial of dimensions of experience. Thus, one feature of the disenchantment of 
modern organizations is the exclusion from the practice of theorizing experience of 
that mystical wisdom, which is derived from theoria.  
 
The Contemplative Position 
Before we proceed in the next section to outline the theological and philosophical 
shifts that have accompanied the movement from theoria to theory, and the 
implications for theorizing work and organization, it is helpful to provide an example 
of modern theorizing with resonances of theoria. This is found in a discipline where 
the original visual sense of theoria remains significant: psychoanalysis. Whilst not 
pervasive, it is possible to find in this field of literature a conception of theory as a 
frame of mind, a way of seeing. For example, Bollas (2007) suggests: ‘Theories are 
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views. Each theory sees something that the other theories do not see’; they are ‘forms 
of perception’ (p.5, 77, original emphases). In this Bollas retains the notion of theory 
as the practice of seeing rather conceiving of theory as essentially different from 
practice.  
 
Through this metaphor of seeing it is possible to illustrate the difference between 
modern conceptions of theory and the ancient notion of theoria, which is 
simultaneously knowing and practice. To express this in another way, theoria is not a 
means of gaining empirical knowledge discovered through the gaze, it is the gaze. 
 
The visual metaphor, however, is not sufficient for our purposes because theoria 
cannot be understood merely as seeing. Again, we are able to find an illustration in 
the field of psychoanalysis that shares similarities with theoria both in the nature of 
the practice described and in terminology. We refer to Black’s (2006) suggested case 
for a contemplative position, using Melanie Klein’s idea of positions as ‘different 
sorts of consciousness’ (p.75). Black uses insights drawn from both neuroscience and 
psychoanalysis to propose a developmental origin for the contemplative frame of 
mind. He suggests that it represents a reactivation of what he calls the proto-verbal 
stage of development in a human being, the period before the age of around 18 
months, where ‘the largely nonverbal right hemisphere is dominant’ (p. 70). This is an 
idea that is reminiscent of Damasio’s discussion of the role of wordless knowing in 
the emergence of consciousness (Damasio, 2000), which bears some resemblance to 




Black describes moments of contemplation as having their origin in ‘times of 
tranquillity with the mother in the earliest phases of babyhood, which are then 
inscribed in implicit form in the nonverbal structures of the right brain’ (2006: 75). He 
suggests that the shift in dominance from the right to the left hemisphere, ‘which is 
primarily associated with verbal activity’, is accompanied by losses as well as gains, 
losses which ‘are above all to do with the immediacy and vividness of experience’ 
(pp. 70-1). This resonates with the metaphor of contemplation as seeing but with an 
enhanced appreciation of what this might mean: to see in this way – immediately, 
vividly, without words – suggests a profound or, at least, more direct connection with 
reality than is achieved through other forms of consciousness. Black (2006:75) 
suggests that it is possible to conceive of the contemplative position as ‘a further layer 
... which can be accommodated without prejudice to the existing developmental and 
structural models which psychoanalysis employs... This “contemplative position” is 
one from which the experience of being alive in the world can be perceived and 
thought about without the need for immediate action’ (see also Grotstein, 2007: 121-
134). 
 
Theological and Philosophical Transitions 
We have so far considered the loss of depth of experience that is characteristic of the 
disenchantment and secularization of the modern age. We then contrasted this with 
the enchanting possibilities of divine knowledge in theoria. Now we offer a review of 
some of the theological and philosophical transitions that have accompanied this 
movement from theoria to theory. Clearly we cannot claim to offer anything more 
than the most selective review of cultural history over this time period. The range of 
approaches to theology and philosophy separately is vast, let alone considering the 
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interplay between them. Instead, we use in particular the work of Pieper and Hadot 
because they share the ability to translate and interpret the philosophical traditions of 
ancient philosophy and the theological traditions of Christianity and explicitly 
consider the place of theoria in both spheres. We draw on both theology and 
philosophy because, in terms of their origins, they share an understanding of the depth 
of experience in which theoria is grounded:  
Both the philosopher and the theologian seek to discover how the world as a 
whole is constituted and, above all, what man’s [sic] ultimate situation is. It is 
this universality of their questions which marks off both philosophy and 
theology from all other disciplines. Every other discipline establishes itself by 
adopting a selective view-point; no other discipline asks about the universe as 
a whole. (Pieper, 1963: 149; see also 1999/1952b) 
 
In modern organizations a prevailing notion of theory is as a contrast to practice. For 
Aristotle nothing in the philosophical life – the bios theoretikos – was farther from 
this conception of theory than theoria (see Hadot, 2002: 86). The bios theoretikos is 
the philosophical and contemplative life, ‘the life devoted to seeing’ (O’Loughlin, 
1978: 37). Leclerc (1961) argues that from the ancient Greek philosophers and the 
Neoplatonists this understanding of the bios theoretikos ‘passed, with a modified 
meaning adapted to the Christian regime, into the terminology of ancient Christian 
mysticism’, and that in the monastic Middle Ages philosophia still designated ‘not a 
theory or way of knowing, but a lived wisdom, a way of living according to reason’ 




Hadot (1995) argues that for the ancient Greeks philosophy was both a way of life and 
philosophical discourse and that both were valued but only when practiced together, 
their separation being seen as a departure from wisdom. He writes of philosophy and 
philosophical discourse as, ‘incommensurable – but also inseparable. There is no 
discourse which deserves to be called philosophical if it is separated from the 
philosophical life, and there is no philosophical life unless it is directly linked to 
philosophical discourse.’ (Hadot, 2002: 174.)  
 
It is as a response to this tension between philosophy as a way of life and 
philosophical discourse that the ancient schools of philosophy saw dogmas as 
secondary to practice: ‘more than theses, one teaches ways, methods, spiritual 
exercises’ (Hadot, 1995: 341).  The purpose of these methods and spiritual exercises 
was to build a coherent inner representation of reality that constituted a guide to 
everyday living. They were practised with a disciplined and purposeful intent 
following the logos or guiding principle (Brient, 2001 - see below).  
 
Our earlier discussion of apophaticism and cataphaticism illustrates a similar tension 
within theology between way of life and discourse. It is powerfully exemplified in the 
commitment of the desert fathers and mothers of the 4th century C.E. ‘to eschew 
speculation in favour of a practical, ethical hermeneutic’ as Burton Christie (1993: 
135) observes:  
[T]he desert fathers held integrity of words and life to be so important [that] 
the question of how to bring one’s life into conformity with Scripture became 
a burning question. They were convinced that only through doing what the 
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text enjoined could one hope to gain any understanding of its meaning. 
(Original emphasis) 
 
An Ethics of Disinterestedness 
The tensions between theoria and theory, between philosophy/theology as a way of 
life and philosophical/theological discourse, between apophaticism and cataphaticism, 
between depth and disenchantment, are also reflected in the traditional distinction 
within Christianity between two forms of living: the contemplative life, the vita 
contemplativa, and the active life, or vita activa. In the same way that modern 
discourses have marginalised, even excluded, theoria, modern approaches to work 
and organization have also tended to exclude the contemplative in favour of a very 
particular understanding of the active. 
 
Brient (2001: 20) argues that this fundamental change in mentality has taken place 
since the Middle Ages:  
In this transition human self-understanding gradually shifted from that of 
the spectators and admirers of divine creation to that of (as Descartes put 
it) ‘lords and masters of nature’. If knowledge of the world is gained 
passively by contemplation in the Middle Ages – spelled out in terms of 
either divine illumination or abstraction from sense perception – it is won 
through active reconstruction in the modern age.  
 
Brient suggests that this shift has been characterised by a movement from the ‘blissful 
repose of the vita contemplativa to that of the laborious reconstruction of the vita 
activa’ (2001: 24); that theoria changed in meaning to become the modern scientific 
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notion of hypotheses to be tested through empirical experimentation. As humans are 
no longer seen to be at the mercy of the gods this process has led to the emergence of 
a culture dominated by the work ethic and at odds with the receptive ethic of 
contemplation.  
 
Brient’s critique of this shift focuses on the consequent difficulty of establishing an 
ethical framework to guide human action. The utilitarianism that characterises the vita 
activa struggles to find any basis for final judgement because any end merely 
becomes a means in another endeavour. However, when pursued through successive 
iterations of means and ends, meaning eventually becomes meaninglessness.  
 
Brient concludes that humans have a need for a governing principle (logos) through 
which human conceptualisations (hypotheses) can remain connected and therefore 
meaningful. She argues that such a principle will always remain an act of faith 
without which it is difficult to establish an ethical framework. This ethical problem is 
confounded by three issues: the secularization of society; the fading of the 
relationship between theory and ethics; and the impact of utilitarian philosophy, 
which manifests as an unenlightened economism, detaching the management 
decision-making process from any form of robust moral or ethical code: 
The New Manager does not have to make difficult value-judgements, he [sic] 
simply follows a quasimathematical model; New Managers are executors of 
the economic principle. (Huehn, 2008: 831) 
 
It is probably not an overstatement to suggest that reference to an ethics of utility is 
misleading if applied to the vita activa of modern organization in that a desire for 
20 
 
material goods and power has tended to replace any notion of ethics or the moral 
good. For the New Manager, according to Huehn (2008), organizational theory tends 
to be used as just one of the many tools employed in the pursuit of improved 
economic performance. For the New Manager, theory has also lost its ethical 
dimension in its detachment from practice.  
 
This is in stark contrast to Aristotle’s theoria and his, to modern thinking, paradoxical 
notion of theoretical praxis, which 
... consists in choosing no other goal than knowledge. It means wanting 
knowledge for its own sake, without pursuing any particular, egoistic interest 
which would be alien to knowledge. This is an ethics of disinterestedness and 
objectivity. (Hadot, 2002:81) 
 
This reference to objectivity may evoke comparison with modern scientific theory and 
practice. Daston and Galison (2007) argue convincingly that the history of the pursuit 
of scientific objectivity is an intrinsically ethical endeavour; that scientific practice is 
guided by ‘epistemic virtues... [which] are norms that are internalized and enforced by 
appeal to ethical values, as well as to pragmatic efficacy in securing knowledge’ 
(pp.40-41). These ethics may at times be ‘disinterested’ and in this respect we can see 
echoes of theoria in some modern conceptions of theory, although typically 
extricating the knowledge of the divine. Even then, Daston and Galison point out that 
from the seventeenth century to the present day the literature on scientific instruction 
can have strong religious undertones: ‘the humility of the seeker, the wonder of the 
psalmist who praises creation, the asceticism of the saint’ (2007: 40). Such ‘echoes’ 




However, to the extent that modern science has been appropriated for utilitarian ends, 
the notions of objectivity and disinterestedness can be applied only to the espoused 
practice of science rather than to theory itself, which is typically used in an interested 
manner. In this context science that makes claims to objective knowledge is 
methodologically rather than ethically disinterested. We thus return to an important 
feature of theoria: that it is a practice that is always ethically disinterested and valued 
only as an end in itself.  A love of wisdom for its own sake will involve a 
disinterested acceptance of the nature of things without an egoistic drive to 
manipulate and control circumstances to one’s own ends.  
 
Work and Leisure  
A similar thesis is proposed by Pieper (1999 [1952]) in his famous essay on ‘Leisure’. 
He is more direct than Brient in his critique of a culture of work and calls for the re-
establishment of a culture of leisure. By this he is promoting a return to the 
Aristotelian notion of leisure and not what Sperry (2001) has referred to as alienated 
leisure; that is, the simple absence of a requirement for productive work. In the 
ancient tradition, by contrast, leisure is associated with connectedness, with growth in 
knowledge and with understanding of the truth. The Greek term for this conception of 
leisure is skhole, the linguistic root of school.  
 
It is in this sense that, for Pieper, leisure and contemplation are intimately linked. He 
contrasts work, the laborious construction of reality, with leisure, understood as a 
receptive attitude of mind, an acceptance that embraces creation and one’s place 
within it. The tone of such leisure is celebratory, concerned not with what one has 
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done or not done but with who and that [sic] one is. He suggests that the modern 
world – and we would add the modern organization – has lost the capacity to engage 
in life in this way and argues that the contemplative practice of leisure requires a 
largely forgotten form of understanding. In keeping with our exploration of the shift 
in meaning from theoria to theory and commenting upon the period of transition also 
identified by Brient, he suggests that:  
The Middle Ages drew a distinction between the understanding as ratio and 
the understanding as intellectus. Ratio is the power of discursive, logical 
thought, of searching and of examination, of abstraction, of definition and 
drawing conclusions. Intellectus, on the other hand, is the name for the 
understanding in so far as it is the capacity of simplex intuitus, of that simple 
vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye. The faculty of 
mind, man’s knowledge, is both these things in one, according to antiquity and 
the Middle Ages, simultaneously ratio and intellectus; and the process of 
knowing is the action of the two together. The mode of discursive thought is 
accompanied and impregnated by an effortless awareness, the contemplative 
vision of the intellectus, which is not active but passive, or rather receptive, 
the activity of the soul in which it conceives that which it sees. (1999 [1952]: 
9) 
 
Pieper is suggesting a return to a mentality that is both ratio and intellectus, 
acknowledging our need for reason and receptiveness, theory and theoria. However, 
modernity’s dominant desire for, or fantasy of, control is not easily relinquished. Our 
view of ourselves as ‘lords and masters of nature’ achieved through a work ethic is 
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not comfortably ceded, even partially, to a view of ourselves-in-the-world open to a 
simple intuition of truth when guided by an ethic of leisure and disinterestedness. 
 
Leadership Without Contemplation? 
Taking the wide historical canvas we have painted as a backdrop, our intention now is 
to offer a far more focussed critique of a contemporary example of theorization in 
order to illustrate our argument concerning the shift from apophatic theoria to 
disenchanted theory. We have chosen to examine current theory in the organization 
studies field of workplace spirituality and, more particularly, the related sub-genre of 
spiritual leadership theory (SLT) because of their thematic resonance with our 
concerns. 
 
Notwithstanding the long history of philosophical and social theoretical interest in the 
relationship between religion, spirituality and work, so called workplace spirituality 
emerged as an identifiable subspecies of organization studies a little over a decade 
ago. This is not the place to offer an exhaustive review of the burgeoning literature in 
this field, so we point the reader to authors who have undertaken the challenging task 
of mapping the domain (Benefiel, 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Izak, 2011; Lund Dean et al., 
2003; Giacalone and Jukiewicz, 2004; Reave, 2005). Of particular interest for our 
purposes are contributions that theorize and research workplace spirituality in 
hypothetico-deductive terms, since scholarly activity of this nature is becoming a 
mainstream approach to the topic, particularly in North America. Generic examples of 
positivist theorization and study of workplace spirituality would include, inter alia, 
Ashmos and Duchon (2000), Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2004), Giacalone et al. 
(2005), Milliman et al. (2003). Within the sub-genre of spirituality and leadership, 
24 
 
Louis Fry has had a notable influence through his published work on spiritual 
leadership theory (SLT) and the empirical programme that this has given rise to (Fry, 
2003, 2005, 2008). 
 
One of the main difficulties facing proponents of this self-proclaimed new paradigm 
of workplace spirituality is arriving at a meaningful definition of terms. In particular, 
the aspiration of this approach to render spirituality measureable requires a great deal 
of elision, attenuation and condensation with respect to the history of spiritual enquiry 
and experience. Consider, for example, the definition of workplace spirituality offered 
by Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2004b): ‘a framework of organizational values 
evidenced in the culture that promotes employees’ experience of transcendence 
through the work process, facilitating their sense of being connected in a way that 
provides feelings of compassion and joy’ (p. 13, original emphases). This attempt to 
define workplace spirituality is, we suggest, highly contestable. Can the complexity 
and diversity of human experiences of spirituality meaningfully be reduced to the 
expression of reified organizational values and culture, albeit those that purport to 
promote workplace transcendence, connection, compassion or joy? We think not.  
 
A similarly attenuated definition is offered by Ashmos and Duchon (2000) for whom 
spirituality at work consists in ‘the recognition that employees have an inner life that 
nourishes and is nourished by meaningful work that takes place in the context of 
community’ (p.137, original emphases). Once again, from the standpoints of 
theological enquiry and studies of comparative religion this is a deeply contestable 
assertion. From an organization studies perspective, moreover, it raises far more 
questions than it answers. Who or what is doing the recognition here and from what 
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subject position? What is meant by inner life and nourishment in this context? 
Amongst other things, this definition elides all debate and literature in organization 
studies that has been concerned with workplace alienation of employees and the 
potential absence of community in work organizations. 
 
It would require another paper fully to develop this critique of workplace spirituality 
definitions but our immediate purpose is to question how credible any subsequent 
attempts to operationalize and measure workplace spirituality might be if they are 
building on such shaky definitional foundations.  This becomes a crucially important 
question once one considers that advocates of new paradigm research in this field see 
themselves explicitly as advancing an objectivist organization science (see, for 
example, Fry, 2003; Fry et al., 2005; Giacalone and Jurkiewicz, 2004); a science, 
moreover, that holds out the possibility, in principle, of complete explanation through 
the incremental accumulation of well-theorised empirical knowledge. Invoking 
licence from writers, such as, Kuhn (1970) and Burrell and Morgan (1979), 
proponents of this approach see themselves as pioneers of a new functionalist 
paradigm, which, although embryonic in form, promises to become a fully fledged 
‘normal science’ in due course. Such claims to objectivity, normalization and 
complete knowledge serve to illustrate precisely the move from an apophatic 
conception of theoria to a disenchanted and, as we argue shortly, performative 
(Lyotard, 1984) form of theorization. It is all the more ironic that such a development 
has occurred within a field of study that is sympathetic to the notion of human 
spirituality in the workplace. The rendering of spirituality in organization scientific 




The new paradigm attempts to theorize workplace spirituality and spiritual leadership 
in ways that make the concepts amenable to measurement and hypothetico-deductive 
modelling. Fry et al. (2005), for instance, employ a Spiritual Leadership Theory 
questionnaire that includes a 1–5 (from strongly disagree to strongly agree) Likert 
response set to measure such constructs as, vision, altruistic love, meaning/calling, 
organizational commitment and productivity. In a similar vein, Ashmos and Duchon 
(2000) developed a 34-question instrument with a 7-point Likert-type scale based on 
psychometric data from 689 respondents. It was deployed in a subsequent study of 
healthcare organizations by Duchon and Plowman (2005). More recently, Martin and 
Hafer (2009) sought to test empirically the relationship between emotional 
intelligence, spiritual intelligence, and performance using a modified version of the 
Ashmos and Duchon instrument and other measures. 
 
We see from these examples that proponents of the new paradigm purport explicitly 
to analyse the relationship between corporate spirituality and organizational 
performance or spiritual leadership and organizational performance. The case is made 
starkly by Krahnke et al. (2003) when they assert that: 
To have confidence that our suppositions are more than personal assumptions 
requires the dispassionate objectivism afforded by the scientific method… 
[O]rganizations need conclusive evidence connecting workplace spirituality 
with bottom line performance; anything less would bring into question their 
fiduciary responsibility to stockholders and their moral responsibility to 
stakeholders. For workplace spirituality to be a viable construct in improving 
organizations and the people in them, it requires a degree of confidence we 
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can only attain through scientific measurement (pp. 397–398, added 
emphases). 
 
In this quotation we see a particularly strong claim regarding the scientific imperative 
to generate viable knowledge of workplace spirituality through accurate measurement 
of the phenomenon combined with a moral imperative to link that knowledge to 
corporate financial performance.  
 
It is, we contend, based on a highly reductive and utilitarian view of corporate 
responsibility which, pace Friedman (1962), privileges the shareholder over other 
stakeholders, including employees. Krankhe et al.’s proposition also entails an 
implicit erosion of the traditional fact-value distinction that has typified positivist 
social scientific research throughout its post-Enlightenment development (MacIntyre, 
2007). To that extent it accords closely to the postmodern model of knowledge, 
characterized by the emergence of performativity, identified by Lyotard (1984). 
According to Lyotard, the search for Truth is replaced by a search for the Efficient 
under what he terms the ‘principle of optimal performance’ (Lyotard, 1984:111). An 
economic episteme based on the utilitarian language game of more output for less 
input displaces the scientific episteme under the condition of postmodernity. Lyotard 
theorises this new basis of knowledge – the optimisation of input to output – as 
performativity (1984:112). One consequence of post-industrial society's privileging of 
the ends of action over its means is that knowledge ceases to be a valid end in itself. 
Knowledge is assessed economically not by its truth-value but by its exchange-value; 
that is, it is produced in order to be sold. It becomes subsumed within a flow of capital 




Our ethical concern about the programmes of theorizing and empirical research 
outlined above centre on the fact that attempts to measure employee spirituality, 
leader/follower spirituality or, indeed, corporate spirituality, involve the positioning 
and subjectification of persons within reductive, instrumental matrices.  Individual 
and collective responses – indeed, individual and collective spirit – are rendered as 
statistics suitable for techno-calculative manipulation within an objectivist scheme. A 
performative attitude toward the social scientific investigation of workplace 
spirituality and leadership thus necessitates: (a) a highly attenuated and narrow 
conception of spirituality; (b) egocentric notions of leader/follower relations; and (c) 
an impoverished conception of theory. While the science of workplace spirituality 
may be couched within a rhetoric of value neutrality and apolitical contribution to 
knowledge, it not only contributes to the maintenance of an economic and political 
status quo but threatens further to invade the subjectivity of the employee under the 
performative auspices of managing spirituality.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have argued, in necessarily broad and generic terms, that modern 
understandings of theory evolved from ancient Greek conceptions of theoria. We 
have traced not only an etymological relationship between theoria and theory but also 
sought to point to the bifurcation of theology and philosophy - notions which were 
inseparable within Greek philosophical thought and practice, as they have also been, 
for example, in St Augustine’s City of God or in the writings of Marsilio Ficino in the 
15th century. This bifurcation became the mise-en-scène for subsequent 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment development of an increasingly disenchanted 
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and denuded conception of theory; one which came to owe much to utilitarian 
philosophy at the expense of the apophatic attitude that, we claim, characterized 
certain forms of theoria.  
 
We have outlined the ways in which the act of holding together both the active and 
the contemplative is how classically informed philosophy understood mind, in its two 
faculties of ratio and intellectus. However, modern organizations and society have 
tended to let go of an appreciation of the latter, depending upon reason and argument 
for their certainties. Theoria has given way to theory thereby shifting the ground of 
philosophy itself. This has allowed modern selves to forget their vulnerability and 
dependence, asserting themselves within the world, believing that there is nothing that 
they cannot achieve if only they apply themselves with sufficient vigour and 
dedication. Developments since the Middle Ages have demonstrated the power of 
theories to subdue creation, increase our prosperity and improve health. However, 
ours is also a world under strain and out of balance and deeply in need of more ethical 
forms of leadership. Struggles and debates continue over what this might mean– if not 
an ethics of utility – let alone how it might be achieved.  
 
Modern experience, we contend, is also far removed from the experiences and 
potential of theoria. The philosophies of antiquity (as seen through the eyes of Hadot 
Pieper, Brient and others) offer contemplation as a vehicle for sensitising humans to 
the universe and to nature through cultivation of a receptive attitude. Whilst this does 
not necessarily generate knowledge in the modern scientific sense it might open 
contemporary minds to an awareness of the relations that exist in the wider 
community and in the organizations of which they are a part. However, as Brient 
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suggests, this will always be an act of faith and the modern mind has become more at 
ease with the apparent certainties of theory than the challenges of developing a 
capacity to live more fully in the present through the practice of theoria. 
Consequently, in the modern context it is difficult to conceive of a norm of work and 
organizational practice that is guided by theoria as well as theory. Our critique of SLT 
was intended to demonstrate how, even within a field of study that is ostensibly 
concerned with, and sympathetic to, workplace spirituality, performative and 
disenchanted theory wins out over theoria. 
 
However, even if theoria cannot be expected to become a norm of work and 
organizational practice we might consider what forms of theorizing might permit an 
ethics of disinterestedness to take root and to evolve. We have demonstrated that 
some theory in the field of psychoanalysis resonates explicitly with psychoanalytic 
practice. Within organization studies there are also examples of theorizing that share 
some connection with theoria as we understand it.  
 
The social sciences have recently been experiencing what Garber et al. (2000) refer to 
as an ethical turn; one which privileges corporeal enactment of ethics over rational 
and cognitive theorization associated with Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
philosophy. Drawing inspiration from such post-structural philosophers, these 
approaches seek to reintroduce the situated facticity of the body into an apprehension 
and appreciation of ethical moments. Derrida (1995, 1999) argues, for instance, that 
the truly ethical impulse occurs in a moment of undecidability that presents itself 
outside the ambit of moral norms, codes or laws. If one is simply following a 
prescribed ethical norm in acting, Derrida maintains, then the action is not genuinely 
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ethical since it is rooted in a false sense of the known, or the certain; decisions must 
always undergo a ‘trial of undecidability’ (Derrida, 1988: 210).  Influenced by the 
writing of Levinas, ethics is here conceived – or more properly manifest - on the basis 
of face-to-face encounters with others and situations that are pre-cognitive, pre-
reflective and pre-gnostic (Derrida, 1999).  
 
Rhodes and Pullen (2009) have applied these forms of post-structural arguments to 
organizational settings in which, they contend, demands for corporeal enactment of 
ethics always exceed formal organizational principles, codes or rules. They work with 
Diprose’s notion of an ‘ethico-political’ process (Diprose, 2000) to posit a corporeal 
ethics of generosity which takes purchase against the kinds of non-ethics instantiated 
through corporate codes of ethics. The spirit of generosity and altruistic concern for 
the other is not something that can be legislated for or controlled by formal 
organizational codes; rather, it is rooted a priori in human relationship. This particular 
take on corporeal ethics, moreover, may have promising applications in the field of 
the ethics of care (Gabriel, 2009; Latimer, 2011; Letiche, 2008). 
 
Our point in drawing attention to this ethical turn in social science generally, and 
organization studies in particular, is to suggest that there is potentially a close parallel 
between post-structural notions of corporeal ethics and the experience of apophatic 
theoria which would be fruitful to explore further. As with our characterization of 
theoria, the corporeal ethical moment entails a form of situated connectedness that is 
beyond words, conception and seeing. In short it has to be experienced rather than 
known in any rational sense (see also Case and Gosling, 2007). Developing and 
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articulating the relationship between theoria and a secular embodied ethics would, we 




A Smaller Latin-English Dictionary (1933) Revised Edition, J.F. Lockwood. London: 
John Murray. 
 
Ashmos, D., and Duchon, D. (2000) ‘Spirituality at Work: A Conceptualization and 
Measure’, Journal of Management Inquiry, 9(2): 134–145. 
 
Bamford, C. (ed.) (1994) Rediscovering Sacred Science. Edinburgh: Floris Books. 
 
Benefiel, M.(2003) “Mapping the Terrain of Spirituality in Organization Research’, 
Journal of Organizational Change Management, 16(4): 367-377. 
 
Benefiel, M. (2005a) ‘The Second Half of the Journey: Spiritual Leadership for 
Organizational Transformation’, Leadership Quarterly, 16: 723–747. 
 
Benefiel, M. (2005b) Soul at Work. Dublin: Veritas Publications. 
 
Berry, T. (1999) The Great Work: Our Way into the Future. New York: Bell Tower. 
 
Black, D.M. (2006) ‘The case for a contemplative position’, in David M. Black (Ed.) 
Psychoanalysis and Religion in the 21st Century: Competitors or Collaborators? 
London: Routledge, pp. 63-79. 
 
Bollas, C. (2007) The Freudian Moment. London: Karnac. 
 
Brient E. (2001) ‘From Vita Contemplativa to Vita Activa: Modern 
Instrumentalization of Theory and the Problem of Measure’, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, 9(1):19-40. 
 
Bronk, R. (2009) The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brown, D. (2004) God and Enchantment of Place: Reclaiming Human Experience. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational 
Analysis. London: Heinemann. 
 
Burton-Christie, D. (1993) The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for 
Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organizational 




Case, P. and Gosling, J. (2007) ‘Wisdom of the Moment: Premodern Perspectives on 
Organizational Action’, Social Epistemology, 21(2): 87-111.  
 
Damasio, A. (2000) The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of 
Consciousness. London: William Heinemann. 
 
Daston, L. and Galison, P. (2007) Objectivity, New York: Zone Books 
 
Derrida, J. (1988) Limited Inc., Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Derrida, J. (1995) The Gift of Death, trans. D. Willis, London: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Derrida, J. (1999) Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. P.-A. Brault and M. Naas, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Diprose, M. (2002) Corporeal Generosity: On Giving with Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Duchon, D. and Plowman, D.A. (2005) ‘Nurturing the spirit at work: Impact on work 
unit performance’, The Leadership Quarterly, 16: 807–833. 
 
Endean, P. (2005) ‘Spirituality and Theology’, in P. Sheldrake (ed.) The New SCM 
Dictionary of Christian Spirituality: 74-79. 
 
French, R. and Simpson, P. (2006) ‘Downplaying leadership: Researching how 
leaders talk about themselves’. Leadership, 2(4): 469-79. 
 
Friedman, M. (1962) Capitalism and Freedom. London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Fry, L. W. (2003) ‘Toward a Theory of Spiritual Leadership’, Leadership Quarterly, 
14: 693-727. 
 
Fry, L. W. (2005) ‘Toward a Theory of Ethical and Spiritual Well-being, and 
Corporate Social Responsibility through Spiritual Leadership’, in R. Giacalone and C. 
Jurkiewicz (eds) Positive Psychology in Business Ethics and Corporate 
Responsibility. Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing, pp. 47–83. 
 
Fry, L.W. (2008) ‘Spiritual Leadership: State-of-the-Art and Future Directions for 
Theory’, Research, and Practice. In J. Biberman & L. Tishman, L. (eds), Spirituality 
in Business: Theory, Practice, and Future Directions. New York, NY: Palgrave, pp. 
106-124.  
 
Fry, L. W., Vitucci, S. and Cedillo, M. (2005) ‘Spiritual Leadership and Army 
Transformation: Theory, Measurement, and Establishing a Baseline’, Leadership 
Quarterly, 16: 835–862. 
 
Gabriel, Y. (2009) ‘Reconciling an Ethic of Care with Critical Management 




Garber, M., Hanssen, B. and Walkowitz, W.L. (2000) The Turn to Ethics. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Giacalone, R. A., and Jurkiewicz, C. L. (2004) Handbook of Workplace Spirituality 
and Organizational Performance. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Giacalone, R. A., Jurkiewicz, C. L., and Fry, L. W. (2005) ‘From Advocacy to 
Science: The Next Steps in Workplace Spirituality Research’, in R. Paloutzian (ed.) 
Handbook of Psychology and Religion. London: Sage. 
 
Gronn, P. (2000) ‘Distributed Properties: a new architecture for leadership’, 
Educational Management and Administration, 28: 3: 317-38. 
 
Gronn, P. (2002) ‘Distributed Leadership as a Unit of Analysis’, Leadership 
Quarterly, 13: 423-51. 
 
Grint, K. (2007) ‘Learning to Lead: Can Aristotle Help Us to Find the Road to 
Wisdom?’ Leadership, 3(2): 231-46. 
 
Grotstein, J.S. (2007) ‘The concept of the ‘transcendent position’’, in James S. 
Grotstein, A Beam of Intense Darkness: Wilfred Bion’s Legacy to Psychoanalysis. 
London: Karnac. 
 
Hadot, P. (1993) Plotinus, or The Simplicity of Vision. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Hadot, P. (1995) Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to 
Foucault. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Hadot, P. (2002) What is Ancient Philosophy? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Handy, C. (1989) The Age of Unreason. London: Business Books. 
 
Holmes, R. (2008) The Age of Wonder: How the Romantic Generation Discovered the 
Beauty and Terror of Science. London: Harper Press. 
 
Huehn, M.P. (2008) ‘Unenlightened Economism: The Antecedents of Bad Corporate 
Governance and Ethical Decline’, Journal of Business Ethics 81:823–835. 
 
Izak, M. (2011) ‘Exploring the Cogency of Organizational Spirituality: Functionalism, 
Boundlessness and Rationality’, PhD thesis, University of Essex.  
 
Jironet, K. (2010) Female Leadership: Management, Jungian Psychology, Spirituality 
and the Global Journey Through Purgatory. London: Routledge. 
 
Johnston, W. (1974) The Mysticism of the Cloud of Unknowing. Wheathampstead, 




Keating, T. (1992) Open Mind, Open Heart. The Contemplative Dimension of the 
Gospel. Shaftesbury: Element Books. 
 
Keats, J. (1956) Poetical Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Krahnke, K., Giacalone, R., and Jurkiewicz, C. (2003) ‘Point–counterpoint: 
Measuring Workplace Spirituality’, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 
16(4): 396–405. 
 
Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. London: Chicago University 
Press. 
 
Ladkin, D. (2010) Rethinking Leadership. A New Look at Old Leadership Questions. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Lang, R.D. (1981) The Politics of Experience and the Bird of Paradise, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Latimer, J. (2011) ‘Membering and Re-membering Care: Older People, Practitioners 
and the Art of Dwelling’, paper presented at the ‘Ethics, Embodiment and 
Organizations’ conference, 19th May, Swansea University. 
 
LeClerc, J. (1961) The Love of Learning and the Desire for God. A Study of Monastic 
Culture. New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Letiche, H. (2008) Making Health Care Care, New York: Information Age 
Publishing. 
 
Louth, A. (1981) The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to 
Denys. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lovelock, J.E. (1979) Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lund Dean, K., Fornaciari, C. J., and McGee, J. (2003) ‘Research in Spirituality, 
Religion, and Work: Walking the Line Between Relevance and Legitimacy’, Journal 
of Organizational Change Management, 16(4): 378–395. 
 
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: University of 
Manchester Press. 
 
MacCulloch, D. (2009) A History of Christianity. London: Allen Lane. 
 
MacIntyre, A. (2007) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth 
 
Marcuse, H. (1964) One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 




Martin, T. and Hafer, J (2009) ‘Models of Emotional Intelligence, Spiritual 
Intelligence, and Performance: a Test of Tischler, Biberman, and McKeage’, Journal 
of Management, Spirituality and Religion, 6(3): 247-257. 
 
Milliman, J., Czaplewski, A., and Ferguson, J. (2003) ‘Workplace Spirituality and 
Employee Work Attitudes: An Exploratory Empirical Assessment’,  Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 16(4): 426–447. 
 
Needleman, J. (1993) Lost Christianity. A Journey of Rediscovery to the Centre of 
Christian Experience. Shaftesbury: Element Books. 
 
Nightingale, A.W. (2004) Spectacles of Truth  in Classical Greek Philosophy. 
Theoria in its Cultural Context. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
O’Loughlin, M. (1978) The Garlands of Repose. The Literary Celebration of Civic 
and Retired Leisure. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Pieper, J. (1963) An Introduction to Thomas Aquinas. London: Faber and Faber. 
 
Pieper, J. (1990) Only the Lover Sings: Art and Contemplation. San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press. 
 
Pieper, J. (1999/1952) Leisure. The Basis of Culture. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 
 
Pieper, J. (1999/1952b) ‘The Philosophical Act’, in Leisure. The Basis of Culture. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 69-140. 
 
Pieper, J. (2002) The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas: A Breviary of 
Philosophy, arranged by Josef Pieper. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. (First published 
1948, London: Sheed & Ward.) 
 
Rahner, K. (1978) Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of 
Christianity. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. 
 
Ramsey, B. (2004) (Ed) John Cassian: The Conferences. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press. 
 
Reave, L. (2005) ‘Spiritual Values and Practices Related to Leadership 
Effectiveness’, Leadership Quarterly, 16: 655–687. 
 
Rhodes, C. and Pullen, A. (2009) ‘Organizational Moral Responsibility’, in S.R. 
Clegg and C. Cooper (Eds) The Sage Handbook of Organizational Behaviour, Vol.2, 
pp. 340-355, London: Sage. 
 
Roszack, T. (1972) Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in 
Postindustrial Society. London: Faber and Faber. 
 
Schumacher, E.F. (1977) A Guide for the Perplexed. London: Jonathan Cape. 
 





Skolomowski, H. (1992) Living Philosophy: Eco-Philosophy as a Tree of Life. 
London: Arkana. 
 
Sperry, E.A. (2001) ‘Alienated Leisure’. Paper presented at the conference: Work as 
Key to the Social Question. The Great Social and Economic Transformations and the 
Subjective Dimension of Work (September), Rome and Vatican City. 
 
Stacey, R. (2007), Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics: The 
Challenge of Complexity. Fifth Edition, Prentice Hall: Harlow. 
 
Thompson-Uberuaga, W. (2005) ‘Quietism’, in P. Sheldrake (ed.) The New SCM 
Dictionary of Christian Spirituality: 523-5. 
 
Turner, D. (1995) The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ware, K. (1982) The Orthodox Way. New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press 
 
Ware, K. (1986) ‘Ways of Prayer and Contemplation: 1. Eastern’, in B. McGinn and 
J. Meyendorff (eds) Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul: 395-414. 
 
Wood, M. (2005) ‘The Fallacy of Misplaced Leadership’, Journal of Management 
Studies, 42: 1101-21. 
 
